Huldingingsbundel vir CR Snyman by Joubert, J. J.
/ /  Joubert
Editor/Redakteur
Essays in honour of 
sbundel vir





University of South Africa, Pretoria 
Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, Pretoria
© University of South Africa 
First edition, first impression 2008
ISBN 978-1-86888-491-9
Printed by Jakaranda Printers
Published by the University o f South Africa 
PO Box 392, 0003 Pretoria
© All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form of by any 
means -  mechanical or electronic, including recordings or tape recording and photocopying, 
excluding fair quotations for purposes of research or reviews.
TABLE OF CONTENTS / INHOUDSOPGAWE
Redakteursvoorwoord ■ Editor’s p re face .........................................................................................v
././ Joubert
Preface
R M a ré .................................................................................................................................................vi
Carel Rainier Snyman, juris, akademikus, mens: 'n woord van waardering
S.*i S tra u ss ............................................................................................................................................x
Carel Rainier Snyman: enkele biografiese notas .....................................................................  xvi
Photo section ...................................................................................................................................xxv
Money to be paid to a tsunami relief fund as a condition 
of a suspended sentence or as a fine in traffic offences
PM Bekker ............................................................................................................................................ 1
A saga of snitches and whistleblowers: the boundaries 
of criminal liability for breach of statutorily-imposed 
duties especially in the context o f organised crime
JBurchell .......................................................................................................................................... 10
The accused's right to cross-examination vs
the admission of hearsay ev idence: a balancing o f interests?
F Cassini ............................................................................................................................................31
The seriously ill or dying patient’s right to know
LC Coetzee ..........................................................................................................................................55
The development of ficta confessio as a principle of 
pleading in South African civil procedural law
JA F a ris .............................................................................................................................................. 76
A peregrination through the law of provocation
S H octor ............................................................................................................................................ 110
Trafficking in human beings
B Huber .............................................................................................................................................169
Sentencing corporations: the need for reform
L Jordaan ........................................................................................................................................181
Prostitution and the enforcement of morality
S Loiter ............................................................................................................................................ 196
Die Strafvorschriften der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
gegen den Nationalsozialismus
HC F-C Schroeder ........................................................................................................................206
Towards a regional labour standards agreement for 
Southern Africa: a lesson from NAFTA
O Sibanda ....................................................................................................................................... 219
Die Onafhanklike Klagtedirektoraat: ’n demokratiese waghond 
of polisie-skoothondjie?
P Swanepoel..................................................  231
Art and science as fundamental right defences in South Africa
K van Rooyen ....................................................  252
Redakteursvoorwoord ■ Editor’s preface
Afgesien van enkele persoonlike bydraes oor Kallie Snyman die mens, 
ampsgenoot en vriend, word daar in hierdie publikasie "n aantal vakbydraes 
byeengebring wat spesifiek geskryf is vir die huldigingsbundei vir Professor CR 
Snyman, uitnemende strafregjuris en gewaardeerde kollega in die Department 
Straf- en Prosesreg van die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika oor 'n tydperk van drie 
dekades. Tans ’n professor emeritus van hierdie departement, is Professor 
Snyman ook ’n Navorsingsgenoot van die departement en lewer hy steeds 'n 
beduidende bydrae tot die corpus navorsing van departementslede.
Die aanvoorwerk vir hierdie bundel is gedoen deur die redaksionele komitee: 
Professore Louise Jordaan, Sunette Loiter en Stephan Terblanche van die 
Departement Straf- en Prosesreg. Ek bedank hulle graag vir hul samewerking.
Thanks are due to Professor Danny Titus, former Acting Executive Dean of the 
College of Law and to the Publications Committee of Unisa for the means of 
financing the publication of these essays (and the presentation function).
The publication effort was considerably eased by the valued assistance of Ms 
Mariki Rudolph of the Institute of Foreign and Comparative Law of this 
university and Ms Hetta Pieterse of Unisa Press. Furthermore, I should like to 
thank Ms Alexa Bamby, Ms Jane Smith and Ms Marianne Visser of the 
Directorate: Language Services for their assistance in the English and Afrikaans 
language editing of the various contributions, and Mr Oswald Davies for his 
assistance in the language editing of the article in German.
A special word of thanks to all those (colleagues and others, nationally and 
internationally) who have collaborated with Professor Snyman during his career 
and made contributions to this publication -  the fruits of which will be a lasting 
tribute to Kallie Snyman.
JJ Joubert 
Editor




Professor Kallie Snyman is without doubt the most prominent scholar in 
Criminal Law who has ever been attached to Unisa. His contribution to the 
debate around contentious issues in criminal law and ultimately on the 
development of criminal law theory and criminal law practice in South Africa 
is immeasurable.
Professor Snyman’s publications are indeed impressive. The Afrikaans edition 
of his textbook Strafreg/Criminal Law' saw its fifth edition in 2006. This major 
work is supplemented by two books namely Misdade betreffende 
afhanklikheidsvormende misdade (1974) and A draft criminal code (1995) as 
well as numerous chapters in books and more than forty articles in accredited 
journals. Assessing Professor Snyman’s impact on South African law on the 
basis of these numerous publications and contributions is such an immense task 
that it may in itself be the subject of a thesis in years to come!
I am convinced that Professor Snyman himself would regard his work on the 
normative theory of culpability as one of his major contributions to the 
development of criminal law in South African law. Based on German legal 
theory, the normative theory of culpability regards culpability as an evaluation 
of the offender’s intention or will. According to this theory an offender whose 
unlawful conduct and state of mind comply with all the elements of a crime can, 
in the words of Professor Snyman in Criminal law’ (4ed 2002) at 153, only be 
blamed if he acted ’in circumstances under which the law could fairly have 
expected him to act differently, namely to refrain from proceeding with his 
unlawful act’. The application of this theory of culpability offers a basis for 
finding an accused who intentionally killed another under coercion not guilty 
without recognising such coercion as a ground of justification excluding the 
unlawfulness of the act. Professor Snyman also pointed out that the application 
of the nonnative theory of punishment would also limit the defence of mistake 
of law, recognised in S vDe Blom 1977 3 513 (A), in that only unavoidable or 
unreasonable mistakes of law would be a defence.
The normative theory of culpability received some recognition in cases such as 
S v Goliath 1972 3 SA 1 (A), S v Bailey 1982 3 SA 772 (A) and S v Mandela 
2001 1 SACR 156 (C) and sparked a lively debate in academic circles. (See for 
example Van Oosten 1995 THTHR 361 and 568.)
’Vice Principal: Academic and Research, University of South Africa.
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One of Professor Snyman’s first contributions to criminal law in South Africa 
is probably his doctoral thesis on theft in South Africa, accepted in the early 
1970s by the then University of the Orange Free State. In this thesis he argued 
that the act of theft should be defined as an act of appropriation and not as a 
contrectatio, a term favoured by the courts at that stage. He correctly pointed 
out that the term contrectatio originally referred to a handling or touching of the 
object o f theft, and that this view of the act of theft was inappropriate in a 
modem economy. His excellent exposition and explanation of an act of 
appropriation, namely an act which deprives the lawful owner or possessor of 
his property and whereby the thief himself exercises the rights of an owner in 
respect of the property, paved the way for the courts in a number of cases to 
accept that the act of theft is more than a mere handling of an item and provided 
a sound basis to distinguish between a completed theft and an attempted theft. 
His systematic analysis of the crime of theft, as is evident in his textbook 
Strafreg/Criminal Law went a long way toward demystifying and clarifying this 
complex crime for students, researchers and legal practitioners.
Other areas of note to which Professor Snyman made important contributions 
are the structure of criminal liability w ith the introduction of the concept of the 
definitional elements of a crime; the principle of legality w ith the introduction 
of the five Latin phrases of ins acceptum, ins cerium, ins praevium, ius strictum 
and nulla poena to explain this theoretical concept; the law relating to aberratio 
ictus with the criticism against the so-called ‘doctrine of transferred intent’; 
causation in law with the promotion of the causal theory of causation; the law 
relating to criminal liability for omissions, private defence, putative crimes, 
mistake and participation as well as the law relating to the crimes of contempt 
of court, incitement and assault.
An excellent feature of the later editions of Strafreg/Criminal Law is the 
detailed incorporation and discussion of the impact of the Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution on substantive criminal law. Noteworthy aspects are the impact of 
the Bill of Rights on the principle of legality and crimes with vague definitions.
Though Professor Snyman followed a theoretical, dogmatic and scientific 
approach to criminal law, he also firmly believed that criminal law should serve 
and protect society. He openly propagated a deviation from the dogmatic 
approach in instances where he believed that dogmatism would not serve the 
interests of society. He was critical of the recognition of the defence of mistake 
in law in S v De Blom, supra, the recognition of voluntary intoxication as a 
complete defence in S v Chretien 1981 1 S A 1097 (A) and the recognition of the 
defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity in S v Campher 1987 1 SA 940 
(A) and S v Wiid 1990 1 SACR 561 (A). Professor Snyman thus welcomed the 
creation of the offence of ‘statutory intoxication’ in the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1 of 1988 and the erosion of the defence of non-pathological
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intoxication in SvEadie  2002 1 SACR 663 (SCA). Professor Snyman is also 
one of a few legal academics who propagates the reinstatement of the death 
penalty. In Criminal Law 4ed 29 he states that the judgment in S v Makwanyane 
1995 3 SA 391 (CC); 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC), in which the death sentence was 
abolished as unconstitutional, had been catastrophic for the country. He believes 
that the high murder rate in the country justifies an amendment to the 
Constitution to reinstate the death penalty, which he believes will go a long way 
toward protecting society against violent crimes.
Professor Snyman’s research and scholarly work is of such a high quality that 
it is no wonder that he was honoured by the FAK for the Afrikaans edition of 
Strafreg and received the Chancellor’s Prize from Unisa as the best senior 
researcher.
Like the true scholar and academic he is. Professor Snyman never required his 
colleagues to agree with him on his views on criminal law or any other issue for 
that matter. As a colleague he was always willing and prepared to listen to 
opposing views and to debate issues. I fondly remember many discussions and 
debates in the tearoom on issues such as accomplice liability for murder, the 
doctrine of common purpose, causation and the normative theory of culpability.
Professor Snyman’s enthusiasm for the discipline of criminal law is clearly 
reflected in his tuition of the subject at Unisa. He was course leader of 
undergraduate and postgraduate modules on criminal law. The management and 
quality of all these modules were excellent. The slogan ‘students come first’, 
coined by Unisa in 2006 as part of the drive to improve service delivery in the 
institution, was in effect practised by Professor Kallie Snyman for many years. 
Students and their academic needs were important to Kallie, and he was always 
prepared to walk the extra mile to ensure that students understood the intricacies 
of criminal law. When, in the early 1990s, Unisa introduced the team approach 
to the development of study material, involving educationalists, curriculum 
designers, graphic designers and editors, many academics refused or were 
reluctant to adopt this approach, fearing that ‘outsiders’ would prescribe to them 
what their study material should contain. Kallie, however, volunteered his 
criminal law course as the pilot project for the Department of Criminal and 
Procedural Law. The first experience of converting what was essentially a text 
book into open distance learning study material could not have been an easy 
process. I can still recall the numerous meetings Kallie and his team had and the 
endless discussions on how the material should be designed. Even Kallie was 
despondent at times. However, the study package created during that process — 
as refined in similar processes later -  is in my view one of the best study 
packages at Unisa. As Head of the Department of Criminal and Procedural Law 
and as Executive Dean of the College of Law, I had very positive feedback from 
students on the criminal law modules. When Unisa applied for accreditation
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from the DETC (Distance Education and Training Council of the USA) during 
the time I was Elead of the Department, I submitted the criminal law guides for 
evaluation to the inspectors. Although they were quite critical of some other 
study packages submitted to them, they were extremely positive and 
complimentary about the criminal law guides.
Professor Snyman played an important mentorship role in the Department of 
Criminal and Procedural Law. During my first years at Unisa he would often 
walk into my office with a Law Report in his hand, telling me that he had just 
read this very interesting case and suggesting that I write a case discussion, at 
the same time offering to read and comment on the discussion when concluded. 
That was how some of my first publications saw the light of day.
A number of academics had the privilege of having their academic careers 
shaped under the guidance of Professor Snyman as members of his criminal law 
team. I think especially of Dr Tertius Geldenhuys (now with SAPS), Mr Abel 
Ramolotja, Mr Loutjie Coetzee and what Kallie used to call ‘die meisies’ (the 
girls), namely Professor Sunette Lotter, Professor Louise Jordaan and Professor 
Karin Alheit. 1 am convinced that ‘the girls’ formed the backbone of the 
criminal law team. Whenever there was a specially daunting, difficult or urgent 
task to be performed, Kallie, on a number of occasions, was heard to say that 
‘the girls’ would complete the task in no time.
I have referred to the role Professor Snyman played at Unisa as a scholar, 
researcher, law teacher and mentor. Kallie Snyman is much more than that. He 
is a friend to all his colleagues, a true and refined gentleman, a connoisseur of 
music, art and films, a musician in his own right and with his wife Fernanda at 
his side, the perfect host. Who will forget the wonderful piano duet Kallie and 
Fernanda played on one occasion when they entertained the criminal law team 
at their home?
Professor Johan Joubert and the colleagues of the Department of Criminal and 
Procedural Law should be commended for their initiative in honouring Prof 
Kallie Snyman with this publication.
Carel Rainier Snyman, juris, akademikus, 




This is a brief word of appreciation of the work of Professor CR (‘Kallie’) 
Snyman. professor emeritus of law of the University of South Africa, 
contributed by S A Strauss, a former colleague and friend of Professor Snyman, 
and of his wife, Mrs Fernanda Snyman.
Mention is made of how Snyman and Strauss first became acquainted when the 
fonner was lecturer in Criminal Law at Rand Afrikaans University in 
Johannesburg and the latter rendered services there as second examiner. In 
1975 Snyman joined the Department of Criminal and Procedural law of which 
Strauss was the head. Soon Snyman started specialising in Criminal Law. He 
published a substantial number of articles in legal journals and became an 
outspoken protagonist of the codification of South African criminal law. In 
1995 he published a draft criminal code for South Africa.
His magnum opus was a substantial handbook on criminal law which was first 
published in 1981 in Afrikaans. Soon thereafter an updated English version of 
the book appeared. The fifth edition of the Afrikaans version was published in 
2006 and the fourth edition of the English version in 2002. The book has 
become a leading work in this field in South Africa, both as textbook in law' 
schools and as handbook in the criminal courts. A special feature of the work 
is the extent to which it reflects contemporary juristic thought in Continental 
jurisdictions as well as Common Law jurisdictions. It also contains many 
references to Roman-Dutch legal sources that form the basis of South African 
common law.
Special tribute is paid to Mrs Fernanda Snyman, who has worked for many 
years in the Language Services Department at Unisa, specialising in legal 
terminology and editorial style.
Dit is vir my werklik ’n eer en 'n voorreg om ’n kort woord van waardering tot 
die inhoud van hierdie bundel by te dra.
"Professor emeritus in regte en voormalige hoof (1960—1979), Departement Straf- en 
Prosesreg, Universiteit van Suid-Afrika.
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Ek het Kallie Snyman, soos liy algemeen bekend is, leer ken kort nadat hy 
aangestel is as senior lektor aan die Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit (RAU), 
onlangs herdoop tot die Universiteit van Johannesburg.
Die RAU het teen die middel van die jare 60 van die vorige eeu tot stand gekom 
as ‘n doelbewuste kultureel-politieke daad van die destydse sterk regering van 
die Nasionale Party. Die Universiteit se eerste -  en hoogs bekwame, doelgerigte 
en dinamiese- rektor was professor Gerrit Viljoen, vroeër professor in klassieke 
tale aan die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, en ’n man wat onder sy vele 
kwalifikasies ook nog die graad LLB agter sy naam kon skryf.
RAU se begindae was beskeie. Die Universiteit, befonds deur sowel die staat 
as die private sektor. het die taamlik gehawende gebouekompleks van ’n groot 
bierbrouery wat na 'n ander, groter en hoogs modeme fabriekskompleks verhuis 
het, oorgeneem en betrek.
Rektor Viljoen se eerste groot taak was om akademiese en administratiewe 
personeel te werf om die universiteit te beman. Daar is op ’n groot skaal 
visgevang in die akademiese waters van Unisa, wat self toe in ’n 
ongeëwenaarde groeifase was. Professor Willem Joubert, destyds dekaan van 
ons regsfakulteit, moes met ’n seer hart afskeid neem van bekwame jong 
dosente soos Johannes van der Walt, Schalk van der Merwe, Giel Reynecke, 
George Barrie en andere.
In sy begindae kon die RAU egter nie die mas opkom met sy eie, 
pasaangestelde personeel nie, maar moes ook nog tydelik en ad hoc die dienste 
aankoop van personeel van ander Afrikaanssprekende dosente verbonde aan 
Unisa, die Universiteit van Pretoria en die Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir 
Christelike Hoër Onderwys. RAU het voortgegaan om vaste personeel elders 
te werf, en so het dit dan gekom dat CR Snyman, advokaat in Bloemfontein, in 
1970 gewerf is. Spoedig ná sy aankoms by RAU, waarvan die studentetal gou 
begin groei het ná sy totstandkoming, is Snyman betrek as dosent in Strafreg. 
Deel van die take waarmee ek destyds by RAU versoek is om te help, was om 
as eksteme eksaminator te dien, in besonder by die afneem van mondelinge 
eksamens. So het dit toe gekom dat ek as taamlike senior van Kallie saam met 
horn by eksamens moes sit.
Nou moet ek eers hier afwyk van my verhaal en sê dat ek op ’n vroeë leeftyd 
reeds ontdek het dat benewens talle moontlike klassifikasies, mense in twee 
groepe verdeel kan word: die m ense-en hulle is ’n oorweldigende meerderheid 
-  wat eers praat en dan dink, en diegene wat eers dink en dan praat. Ek het 
Kallie Snyman kategories by laasgenoemde groep ingedeel. Laat my ook verder 
sê dat die hoë presteerders oorweldigend uit laasgenoemde groep kom.
Xll SA Strauss
Teen die tyd dat ek Snyman leer ken het, was ek reeds meer as 20 jaar met die 
reg en regswese doenig sedert ek in 1949 in die regte begin studeer het. Dit was 
vir my spoedig duidelik dat hierdie stil jongman sy loopbaan emstig bedryf het 
en groot potensiaal aan die dag gelê het. Met alle eerbied gesê, het ek begin 
wonder of sy kollegas aan die RAU horn regtig na waarde skat. Moontlik was 
'n faktor die feit dat hy oënskynlik nie sy doktorale studie kon afhandel nie. Ek 
sê ‘oënskynlik', want hy het my op 'n stadium vertroulik meegedeel dat sy 
promotor -  ’n vooraanstaande Vrystaatse juris, nou reeds lankal oorlede -  
helaas vanweë stadspolitieke bedrywighede gladnie by sy konsepverhandeling 
kon uitkom nie! Hoe dit ook al sy, en ek sny ’n lang storie kort. na aanleiding 
van gesprekke tussen horn en my het hy in 1974 nog as senior lektor by Unisa 
aansoek gedoen om ’n vakante betrekking en ’n aanbod ontvang vir aanstelling 
in die departement waarvan ek destyds hoof was. In 1973 is sy doktorale 
verhandeling uiteindelik gefinaliseer en in 1975 het hy professor in Straf- en 
Prosesreg geword.
Ek kies my woorde nou baie versigtig in die stelling wat volg: ek was vir 20 jaar 
lank hoof van die departement -  1960 tot 1979 -  en was sedertdien nog 
betrokke as lid van keurkomitees vir baie jare. In al daardie jare het ons in 
daardie departement geen beter aanstelling gemaak of geen verdiensteliker 
kandidaat tot professor bevorder as CR Snyman nie. Dit was ook gou duidelik 
dat die opset by Unisa horn soos ’n handskoen gepas het. Hy kon die primêre 
taak van ’n dosent verrig, maar kon horn ook deurlopend laat geld by wyse van 
navorsing en skryfwerk.
Die dae van publiseer om geldelike toelaes vir jou departement te verdien het 
toe nog nie aangebreek nie. Dit was grootliks 'n geval van soos Goethe dit 
gestel het in ’n beroemde gedig: 'Ich singe wie ein Vogel der in den Zweigen 
wohnet. Das Lied das mir aus der Kehle dringt, ist Lohn der reichlich lohnet.' 
Snyman se publikasies, sy dit omvangryke artikels, vonnisbesprekings, korter 
aantekeninge of boeke, was deur die bank van hoë gehalte. Boweal getuig sy 
werke van deeglike navorsing, indringende denke en die hoogste gehalte. Sy 
betoog vir die kodifikasie van die strafreg in Suid-Afrika is besonder oortuigend 
en sy Draft Criminal Code for South Africa (1995) is ’n ‘moet lees’.
Sonder twyfel is sy magnum opus sy handboek oor Strafreg wat in 1981 die lig 
gesien het en herhaaldelik in hersiene weergawes gepubliseer is; die jongste is 
die vyfde uitgawe van 2006. Hy het die boek in Engels vertaal en die vertaling 
het het reeds vier uitgawes beleef, die jongste in 2002. Die strafreg was in 1981 
reeds ’n deeglik beskrewe deel van ons reg. In 1917 het Gardiner en Lansdown 
se South African criminal law’ and procedure die lig gesien. Die werk het vir 
dekades die toneel oorheers. Teen die tyd dat die sesde (en laaste) uitgawe van 
hierdie steeds groter wordende werk in 1957 die lig gesien het -  in twee bande 
wat in toto 2 029 bladsye beslaan het -  sou geen regspraktisyn dit in ’n strafhof
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gewaag het sonder dié werk nie. Die werk het egter vanaf sy eerste verskyning 
sterk aangeknoop by die Engelse reg en was bowendien grootliks 'n kompilasie 
van wettereg en gewysdes.
Intussen, in 1949, het professore JC de Wet en HL Swanepoel se Strafreg-e e n 
van die eerste regshandboeke in Afrikaans -  verskyn. Dit was die eerste 
regswetenskaplike werk oor die straffeg in Suid-Afrika. Die skrywers het die 
Romeins-Hollandse reg deeglik erkenning gegee. Boonop het veral Prof JC 
sterk aangeknoop by die hoogstaande Duitse strafregwetenskap. Daarby het hy 
op sy kenmerkende satiriese wyse talle regters, van Lord de Villiers tot regters 
wat in 1949 nog op die regbank gesit het, skerp gekritiseer. Prof JC se studente 
op Stellenbosch het horn aanbid en sy Kontraktereg en handelsreg (met 
medeskrywer James Yeats) sowel as sy Strafreg feitlik uit hul koppe geleer. 
Regspraktisyns en regters wou aanvanklik weinig van dié twee werke weet, 
maar die skrywers se goed gedokumenteerde kritiek het mettertyd deeglik inslag 
by die howe gevind.
Toe die eerste band van ’n sogenaamde heruitgawe van Gardiner en Lansdown, 
met outeurs van die eerste band professor EM (Exton) Burchell en twee 
medeskrywers, in 1970 die lig sien, was dit inderdaad ’n splintemuwe werk wat 
weinig van die kompilatoriese kenmerke van die ou werk vertoon het en sterk 
aangeknoop het by meer modeme gedagterigtings soos vervat in De Wet en 
Swanepoel en die tydskrifartikels van ’n modeme geslag regskrywers. Teen die 
einde van die 20ste eeu is die strafreg te lande oorheers deur twee werke: dié 
van Snyman en die derde uitgawe (ten dele) van Burchell en Hunt 
(laasgenoemde ’n medeskrywer van dié 1970-reeks). Intussen het 'n meer 
akademies gerigte, enkelbandige boek Principles o f criminal law deur JM 
(Jonathan, seun van Exton) Burchell en Milton ook nog in die vroeë 1990s 
verskyn, met ’n tweede uitgawe in 1997. Voorts moet melding gemaak word 
van die derde uitgawe van De Wet en Swanepoel in 1975, deur Prof JC -  nou 
reeds professor emeritus, en alleenskrywer van dié uitgawe omdat prof 
Swanepoel intussen oorlede is. Helaas het die derde uitgawe van hierdie gewilde 
baanbrekerswerk nie goeie resensies in die regstydskrifte ontvang nie, en in die 
strafregspleging op die agtergrond getree.
Vanweë die geweldige omvang van die strafreg-wetgewing, regspraak en 
juristestandpunte oor haas alle fasette, verg dit groot dissipline van 
handboekskrywers om hul werke binne redelike perke te hou: om te 
veralgemeen, onder 750 bladsye. Daar is deesdae nog die faktor van ellelange 
betoë oor menseregte wat in besonder sedert ons nuwe grondwet feitlik mode 
geword het. Die reg betreffende menseregte -  human rights law -  het vir 
sommige juriste en pseudo-juriste feitlik ’n nuwe soort godsdiens geword. 
Standpunte word deur sommige skrywers verkondig wat weinig verband hou 
met die werklikheid en die eise van ’n veilige, ordelike samelewing. Teen die
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tyd dat die regte van wrede, genadelose misdadigers groter aandag geniet as die 
belange van ’n ordelike samelewing, behoort rooi waarskuwingsligte te flikker.
Snyman gee in sy werk erkenning aan ons grondwetlike Handves, maar op ’n 
gebalanseerde wyse. Vandag, aan die begin van die 21 ste eeu, staan sy boek oor 
strafreg op die voorgrond as ’n werk van die hoogste gehalte, beskikbaar in twee 
landstale, en bowendien as die grootste Suid-Afrikaanse stuk werk op dié gebied 
as geheel wat tot dusver uit die pen van ’n enkele juris gevloei het. Die boek is 
nie slegs aanvaar as ’n ideale handboek vir studente nie, maar as ware vade 
mecum vir sowel regspraktisyn as regterlike beampte. ’n Groot verdienste van 
sy werk is dat terwyl De Wet se pionierswerk die begin verteenwoordig van 
erkenning te lande aan Duitse strafregswetenskaplike denke van die vroeë 20ste 
eeu, Snyman se werk algehele vemuwing gebring het deur ons strafregdenke in 
lyn te bring met die jonger Vastelandse regswetenskap. Dit het vanselfsprekend 
nie net ’n teoretiese of sisteembouende uitwerking nie, maar bring ook 
vemuwende praktiese resultate. Snyman het ook geput uit modeme Engelse, 
Skotse en Amerikaanse regsdenke. Dit was ’n uitdaging om uit 'n oewerlose 
oseaan betekenisvolle en tersaaklike sienings na Suid-Afrika te bring.
Snyman se werk is nie net vanuit sy Unisa-kantoor en sy studeerkamer gelewer 
nie. Hy het talle besoeke aan oorsese universiteite en navorsingsinstitute 
gebring. Dit was veral in Duitsland waar hy navorsing gedoen het, maar hy het 
ook akademies gaan put uit kennisbronne in Skotland en die VSA.
En nou het ek nog nie eers gekom by Kallie Snyman as kollega en vriend nie! 
Ek volstaan daannee om te sê dat dit moeilik is om veel name te noem van 
mense op wie ’n mens so kan staatmaak as hardwerkende en betroubare kollega 
-  en as lojale vriend -  as Kallie. Wei het ons deur die jare nie mekaar se 
drumpels deurgetrap nie -  ons was albei baie bedrywige mense -  maar die 
stewige band van vriendskap was altyd daar. ’n Karaktereienskap van Kallie 
Snyman is dat hy stil van aard is en jy nooit ’n woord van kwaadwilligheid 
teenoor kollegas en prominente mense in die samelewing uit sy mond sal hoor 
nie. Ten spyte van sy steeds groeiende status as akademikus was daar nooit 
enige sweem van verwaandheid of grootdoenerigheid by horn nie. Hierdie 
swygsame akademiese reus het rustig sy gang gegaan, vriendelik en korrek 
teenoor almal met wie sy pad gekruis het.
En dan het ons nog nie eens by die belangrikste persoon gekom nie! Sy is 
mevrou Fernanda Snyman. Min het ons geweet, toe Kallie in 1975 by ons 
departement te Unisa aansluit, welke juweel horn vergesél het. Spoedig het ons 
haar leer ken as ’n staatmaker tuisteskepper, uitnemende gasvrou. talentvolle 
musikus -  nes Kallie -  maar bowenal ’n taalkundige wat deur die jare heen 
ontsaglik veel waarde sou toevoeg tot Unisa-studiemateriaal wat die kern van 
onderrig by die universiteit uitmaak. Ek weet dat sy haar laat geld het vanaf dag
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een. Haar taalvaardigheid met Afrikaans sowel as Engels, liaar arbeidsaamheid, 
liaar hulpvaardigheid, haar wye kennis, haar perfeksionisme... waar hou ek op? 
As jy hierdie woorde lees, Fernanda, moet jy weet dat dit diep uit die hart kom 
van ’n man wat 'n groot ereskuld teenoorjou het vir watjy vir hom oor baie jare 
been beteken het. Self gesteld op goeie taalgebruik en ’n soort 
amateurtaalkundige, was daar baie dae dat ek met 'n eie geskrif of dié van ’n 
kollega voor my gesit het en dan in my binneste die kreet van die Psalmdigter 
geopper het: Heer, waar dan heen? Dan het ek maar die draad na jou geslaan -  
soms setfs teësinnig, maar in wanhoop, na jou woonhuis. En nooit, ja nooit het 
jy my 'n onwillige oor gegee nie! Daarvoor bly ek jou dankbaar vir solank ek 
lee f-  en ek is seker daar is talle ander kollegas wat presies net so voel.
Card Rainier Snyman: enkele biografiese 
notas
Curriculum vitae
17 Desember 1940: Gebore op Barkly-Oos
1947: Begin skoolopleiding in Calvinia
1958: Slaag matriek aan die Hoërskool Sentraal, Bloemfontein
1961: Behaal BA (Regte) aan UOVS
1963: Behaal LLB aan UOVS
1962-1963: Regtersklerk van Regter S Hofmeyr in die Hooggeregshof, 
Bloemfontein
1964—1969: Praktiseer as advokaat aan die Vrystaatse balie in Bloemfontein
1970-1974: Senior lektor in Publiekreg, Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, 
Johannesburg
1973: Behaal LLD aan UOVS op grond van ’n proefskrif wat handel oor die 
misdaad diefstal
1975-2005: Professor in die Department Straf- en Prosesreg aan Unisa
Op 5 Julie 1969 getroud met Fernanda Malherbe in Bloemfontein
Twee kinders, ’n seun (Rainier) gebore in 1971 en n dogter (Marina) gebore 
in 1972
Eerste keer oorsee vir twee maande in Desember 1973 en Januarie 1974 by die 
Max-Planck-lnstitut fur auslandisches und intemationales Strafrecht in 
Freiburg, Duitsland
In 1977 elf maande navorsing by dieselfde instituut met behulp van ’n beurs van 
die Alexander von Humboldtstigting in Duitsland
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1982 1983 verdere elf maande navorsing by dieselfde instituut danksy, onder 
meer, dieselfde Von Humboldtbeurs
Daama by verskillende geleenthede vir korte tydperke navorsingsbesoeke aan 
oorsese universiteite, onder meer UCLA in San Francisco, Edinburgh, 
Munchen, Regensburg, Bonn, en by die Freie Universitat in Berlyn
Lys van publikasies
A  B o e k e :
Misdade in verband met afhanklikheidsvormende medisyne (Butterworths, 
Durban 1974).
The law o f South Africa volume 6, Criminal law. Ek is een van verskeie 
skrywers van hierdie boek. Ek het omtrent ’n derde van die boek geskryf
Strafreg (1 uitg Butterworths, Durban, 1981. Hierdie boek beleef verskeie latere 
uitgawes. Die vyfde uitgawe is in 2006 gepubliseer)
Criminal law' (1 uitg Butterworths, Durban, 1984. Hierdie boek beleef eweneens 
verskeie later uitgawes. Die vierde uitgawe is in 2002 gepubliseer)
Strafregvonnisbundel /  Criminal law case book (1 uitg Juta en Kie, Kaapstad. 
1991 en die derde en jongste uitgawe in 2003)
A draft criminal code for South Africa (Juta en Kie, Kaapstad 1995)
Werkboek vir strafreg (1 uitg 1989. Die tweede uitgawe word in 1994 
gepubliseer)
Workbook for criminal law (1 uitg 1989. Die tweede uitgawe word in 1994 
gepubliseer)
B A r t ik e l s , AANTEKENINGE e n  v o n n is b e s p r e k in g s
‘Die verweer van regsdwaling by opsetmisdade: ’n regsvergelykende studie’ 
1968 Responsa Meridiana 131
‘Opsetlike strafbare manslag?’ 1971 THRHR 184
‘Die regsbelange beskerm deur die misdaad abduksie' 1972 TtIRHR 265
‘Die begrippe contrectatio en animus lucrifaciendi in die Romeinse reg’ 1973 
Acta Juridica 271
‘Mens rea in drug offences -  onus of proof 1973 SA U  222
Vonnisbespreking: ‘SvRabson  1973 THRHR 185
Vonnisbespreking: ‘5 v Goncalves’ 1974 THRHR 315
‘Die toe-eieningsbegrip by diefstal’ 1975 THRHR 29
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T he accusatorial and inquisitorial approaches to criminal procedure: some 
points of comparison between the South African and the continental 
systems’ 1975 CILSA 100
‘Watering the dagga pot plant: an uncertain reward’ 1975 SA U  372 
‘Die vermoensmisdade in die lig van die eise van die modeme samelewing' 
1977 SASK 11
‘Laying a false criminal charge’ 1978 SAU  454 
‘The “finalistic” theory of an act in criminal law’ 1978 SASK 3; 136 
‘Die misdaad hoogverraad heroorweeg’ 1979 De Jure 167 
‘The normative concept of mens rea -  a new development in Germany’ 1979 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 211 
T he “finalistic” theory of an act in criminal law’ (1) 1979 SASK 3 
T he “finalistic” theory of an act in criminal law’ (2) 1979 SASK 136. 
‘Sedition revived' 1981 SA U  14
‘Vrywillige terugtrede as ’n verweer op ’n aanklag van poting om ’n misdaad 
tepleeg’ 1980 SASK 189
‘Vrywillige terugtrede as ’n verweer op ’n aanklag van poging’ 1981 SASK 189 
‘Die invloed van Engelse en Duitse reg op die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg’ 1981 
De Jure 148
‘Die misdaad sameswering’ 1984 SASK 3
T he history and rationale of criminal conspiracy’ 1984 CILSA 65.
T he attack on German criminal legal theory -  a retort 1985 SA U  130 
‘Die trouvereiste by die misdaad hoogverraad’ 1988 SASK 1 
Vonnisbespreking: ‘S v Molubi 1988 (2) SA 576 (B)’1988 SASK 457 
Vonnisbespreking: "S v Harber 1986 (4) SA 214 (T)’ 1988 De lure 150 
‘Minagting van die hof en vonnisbesprekings van beslissings waarin ’n appêl 
hangende is’ 1988 THRHR 233
‘Die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid’ 1989 TRW 1 
‘Dolus eventualis in the offences of terrorism, subversion and sabotage' 1990 
SA U  365
‘Die misdaad crimen laesae majestatis’ 1990 THRHR 259 
‘Normatiewe skuld en redelik verwagbare gedrag’ 1991 THRHR 4 
‘Provokasie as ’n algehele verweer in die strafreg’ 1991 Consultus 35 
‘Opmerkings omtrent die legaliteitsbeginsel in die strafreg’ 1991 THRHR 629 
‘’n Koel ontvangs vir die misdaad “statutêre dronkenskap’” 1991 TSAR 504 
‘Dwaling aangaande die oorsaaklike verloop’ 1991 SASK 50 
‘Professor De Wet se statuur as ’n regsvergelykende juris’ 1991 SASK 136 
‘ Wanneer die doodvonnis vir moord opgelê kan word' 1992 Julie Servamus 59 
Vonnisbespreking: T  v Bazzard 1992 (1) SASV 302 (NK)’ 1992 SAS 335 
‘Reforming the law relating to housebreaking’ 1993 SAS 38 
Vonnisbespreking: ‘Amalgamated Beverage Industries Natal v City Council o f 
Durban 1992 2 SASV 183 (N)’ 1993 THRHR 132 
T he definition of proscription and the structure of criminal liability' 1994 SAU  
65
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‘Confusion concerning the defence of ignorance of the law' 1994 SALJ 1 
‘Venrtoedelike toestemming as regverdigingsgrond in die strafreg’ 1996 
THRHR 399
‘Die nonnatiewe skuldbegrip in die strafreg -  'n antwoord' 1996 THRHR 638 
‘Putatiewe noodtoestand by “tref-en-trap" ongelukke' 1996 SAS 220 
‘Strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid vir 'n late-opmerkings oor die sistematiek van 
misdade gepleeg deur 'n late' 1996 SAS 333 
‘Zum Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuchs fur Siidafrika’ 1997 Zeitschrift jur die 
gesamten Strajrechtswissenschajt 434 
‘Potensiële nadeel by bedrog’ 1997 THRHR 691
‘Toestemming in die strafreg -  ’n omskrywingsgrond of ’n 
regverdigingsgrond?' 1998 De lure 332 
‘Nuwe lig op die handelingsvereiste by diefstaf 1998 TSAR 118 
‘ I s daar plek in die Suid-Affikaanse reg vir die “doctrine of transferred intent"?' 
1998 SAS 1
‘Die statutêre misdaad van deelname aan ’n kriminele bende’ 1999 213
‘Codifying the criminal law: the Australian experience’ 2000 SAS 214 
‘Strafbarkeit juristischer Personen aus angelsachsischer und siidafrikanischer 
Sicht’ in Krise des Strafrechts undder Kriminahvissenschaften? Tagungs- 
beitrdge eines Symposiums der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung Bonn- 
Bad Godesberg, veranstaltet vom 1. bis 5. Oktober 2000 in Bamberg 225 
‘Die herlewing van vergelding as regverdiging vir straf 2001 THRHR 218 
‘Broadening the scope of statutory furtum usus’ 2001 SAS 217 
Vonnisbespreking: ‘S v Mani ’ 2002 SAS 363
‘Voorwaardes vir strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid buite onreg en skuld’ 2002 
TSAR 139.
Vonnisbespreking: ‘5 v Fourie’ 2003 De Jure 190
‘The tension between legal theory and policy considerations in the general 
principles of criminal law’ 2003 Acta Juridica 1 
‘Geregverdigde doodslag by inhegtenismening: die bepalings van die nuwe 
artikel 49 van die Strafproseswet’ 2004 Stellenbosch Law Journal 536 
‘The two reasons for the existence of private defence and their effect on the 
rules relating to the defence in South Africa’ in 2004 SAS 178 
‘Private defence in criminal law -  an unwarranted raising of the test of 
reasonableness’ 2004 THRHR 325.
‘Die geweldsbegrip by die misdaad aanranding’ 2004 TSAR 448 
Vonnisbespreking: ‘5 v Sqffier 2003 1 SASV 141 (SOKPA) en S v Kimberley 
2004 2 SASV 38 (OK)’ 2005 De Jure 176 
‘Die misdaad uitlokking (1)' 2005 THRHR 428 
‘Die misdaad uitlokking (2)’ 2005 THRHR 563
‘Dogmatism vs pragmatism in South African criminal law’ Festschrift jur 
Friedrich-Christian Schroeder zum 70. Geburtstag 845 
‘Opmerkings oor die algemene misdaad korrupsie in die nuwe Korrupsiewet 
van 2004' Gedenkbundel vir Labuschagne 1
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'Die erkenning van objektiewe faktore by die verweer van provokasie in die 
strafreg’ 2006 Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap 57 
' Die begrip “besit” in die Strafreg’ (1) (aanvaar vir publikasie in THRHR 2007) 
' Die begrip “besit” in die Strafreg ’ (2) (aanvaar vir publikasie in THRHR 2008,)
Lewensloop
Tussen 1940 en 1945 neem my pa, wat ’n polisie-offisier was, deel aan die 
Tweede Wêreldoorlog en word krygsgevangene geneem. Tydens hierdie 
oorlogsjare woon ek en my twee sussies saam met my ma by familie in 
Cradock. Na my pa in 1945 terugkeer van die oorlog, word hy verplaas na 
Calvinia, waar ons omtrent drie jaar bly. Ek begin my skoolopleiding daar. In 
1948 verhuis ons na Bloemfontein, waar ek my laerskoolopleiding aan die 
President Brandlaerskool voltooi en daama my hoërskoolloopbaan in 1958 aan 
die Sentrale Hoërskool.
Vanaf 1959 tot 1961 studeer ek aan UOVS en woon drie jaar in 
universiteitskoshuise, eers die Reitzsaalkamerwonings en daama in die Huis 
Malberbe. Gedurende die twee jaar waarin ek my LLB-studie ondemeem, woon 
ek in die stad en loop aandklasse by die universiteit. Destyds was al die klasse 
vir LLB slegs in die aand aangebied. Gedurende hierdie twee jare werk ek in die 
Hooggeregshof as regtersklerk van Regter S Hofmeyr.
Vanaf 1964 tot 1969 praktiseer ek as advokaat aan die Vrystaatse balie. Doen 
meestal strafhofwerk, en gaan dikwels op rondgaande hof in die Vrystaat. Ek 
het ook in 'n aantal sake in die Appêlhof in Bloemfontein verskyn. Destyds was 
dit die 'lo t’ van junior advokate in Bloemfontein om pro Deo sake in die 
Appêlhof te moet argumenteer.
Na my huwelik, in 1969, met Fernanda kry ek koue voete vir die advokaatswerk 
en besluit om liewer tot die regsakademie toe te tree. Ek het gevoel ek is meer 
in die wieg gelê vir die regsteorie as die regspraktyk. Ek kry 'n pos as senior 
lektor in Publiekreg aan wat destyds bekendgestaan het as die Randse 
Afrikaanse Universiteit. Die regsfakulteit daar het toe bestaan uit slegs omtrent 
agt lede.
Grootliks deur die ondersteuning en medewerking van Professor Sas Strauss 
word ek vanaf die begin van 1975 aangestel as Professor in Straf- en Prosesreg 
aan UNISA. Toe ek by die departement begin werk het, was daar, as ek reg 
onthou, slegs so ses of sewe dosente in die departement: Sas, wat 
departementshoof was, André Rabie, wat kort daama 'n professoraat by 
Stellenbosch aanvaar het, Cor Eckhardt (wat sedertdien na Nieu-Seeland verhuis 
het) John Middleton, Jannie van Rooyen, en Johan Joubert. Al drie 
laasgenoemde het later departementshoof geword. Kort daama het Chris
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Schmidt vanaf die departement Staats- en Volkereg na ons departement 
oorgekom, asook Peet Bekker vanaf Tukkies.
Aanvanklik het ek Siviele Prosesreg en Kommunikasiereg aangebied, maar koil 
daama het ek begin om Strafreg aan te bied. Dit was aangename jare en die 
samewerking in die departement was, soos nog altyd daama, baie goed. Ek 
onthou hoe ons kort na my aankoms nog lesings gedurende Juliemaand in 
Pretoria moes aanbied vir studente, en dat daar met groot moeite atsonderlike 
klasse virblankes, swartes, ‘Asiate' en ‘kleurlinge' aangebied moes word. Party 
van hierdie lesings het ek in my kantoor aangebied vir slegs twee of drie 
studente.
Unisa het gedurende die dertig jaar wat ek hier gewerk het, natuurlik baie 
verander. Tot 1989 was die regsfakulteit nog in wat bekend gestaan het as die 
ou Samuel Pauwgebou in die middestad, op die hoek van Skinner- en Van der 
Waltstrate. Ons het maar selde by die 'Nuwe Jerusalem’, soos skertsend na die 
indrukwekkende nuwe Unisagebou op Muckleneukrand verwys is, gekom. Die 
manlike dosente was almal stemmig gekleed in das en baadjie, en die 
senaatsvergaderings het die mans almal ewe vroom met pakke klere bygewoon. 
Die biblioteek, toe reeds baie goed toegerus, was ’n doodstil plek waar ’n mens 
ure kon deurbring met navorsing. Ons het dikwels tee gedrink in een of ander 
teedrinkplek in die middestad. Een so 'n plek was in 'n arkade wat in 
Schoemanstraat geleë was, en by die ingang van die arkade was daar aan die een 
kant ’n winkel wat godsdienstige literatuur verkoop het, en aan die ander kant 
een wat grafstene verkoop het. Ek onthou nog goed hoe Sas by die ingang van 
die arkade altyd met sy hand na hierdie twee winkels gewys het en gesê het: 
‘Híér berei jy jou voor vir dáár! ’
Onderrig aan Unisa en navorsing
In die loop van die dertig jaar wat ek aan Unisa verbonde was, het ek gesien hoe 
die studiemateriaal baie verbeter het. Studiegidse het byvoorbeeld baie meer 
gebruikersvriendelik geword. Studentegetalle het egter die hoogte ingeskiet, wat 
’n swaar las op dosente geplaas het, veral gedurende eksamentye. Ofskoon dit 
verblydend is om die sterk groei in studentegetalle te merk, is dit ’n kommer dat 
soveel studente wat nie in hulle moedertaal studeer nie, dit baie moeilik vind om 
hulle korrek en behoorlik uit te druk. Ek vermoed dat die standaard van 
taalonderrig op skool, en veral op sekondêre vlak, nie baie goed is nie en een 
van die hoofoorsake vir hierdie probleem is.
Na my mening was die LLB-kursus wat die studente vroeër jare geneem het, ’n 
kursus wat hulle ’n beter regskwalifikasie gebied het as die LLB-kursus wat die 
universiteite tans aanbied. Die vroeëre LLB-kursus het ’n minimumstudie van 
vyf jaar behels, en studente moes, voordat hulle vir LLB kon inskryf, eers ’n 
Baccalaureus - graad slaag. Hierdie studente se taalvaardighede was beter as
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vandag se LLB-studente, en hulle het in die algemeen ook ’n breër 
agtergrondkennis van die geesteswetenskappe gehad as vandag se studente.
Ek is ook van mening dat die LLM-graad wat studente tans kan behaal deur 
bloot eksamens te skryf, sonder om enige verhandeling te skryf, ’n te maklike 
meestersgraad-kwalifikasieis. Studente behoort, ten einde ’n meestersgraad te 
behaal, na my mening minstens ’n verhandeling te skryf wat die produk van 
selfstandige navorsing is, en waarin hulle gedwing word om hulle gedagtes 
samehangend in aanvaarbare stellings te fonuuleer. Ongelukkig is dit nie tans 
die geval nie.
Drie dekades gelede toe ek by Unisa begin werk het, was die klem in navorsing 
op die sogenaamde ‘swartletter reg’ (‘black-letter law’), dit wil sê die reg soos 
wat dit in werklikheid is, in teenstelling tot die reg soos wat dit behoort te wees. 
Met die politieke en staatkundige veranderinge wat veral sedert 1990 ingetree 
het, het die klem verskuif na grondwetlike onderwerpe en, daarmee saam, 
menseregte. Ofskoon hierdie staatkundige veranderinge natuurlik verwelkom 
moet word, wonder ek tog of daar nie tans te veel gepubliseer word oor 
menseregte en verandering van die reg en die maatskaplike bestel nie. Baie 
artikels wat oor hierdie onderwerpe handel, word dikwels gekenmerk deur 
spekulatiewe redenasies oor redelik vae onderwerpe. Miskien is dit weer tyd om 
meer aandag te wy aan die konkrete onderwerpe. Wat die strafreg meer in 
besonder betref, is daar op die gebied van die besondere misdade sommer baie 
onderwerpe wat met vrug van naderby ondersoek kan word.
Dit is opmerklik dat daar die afgelope tyd betreklik min akademici is wat hulle 
in hulle navorsing toelê op die materiële strafreg. Hierdie verskynsel kan 
moontlik toegeskryf word aan die invoering van die Handves van Regte in die 
nuwe Grondwet, wat gelei het tot 'n groot belangstelling in konstitusionele 
strafprosesreg -  ’n afdeling van die reg waaroor daar wel die afgelope tyd 
heelwat geskryf word. Daar is na my mening nog baie ruimte vir verdere 
navorsing in die materiële strafreg.
Die studie van die strafreg het my nog altyd baie na aan die hart gelê. Een van 
die redes hiervoor is die universaliteit van die probleme of onderwerpe van veral 
die algemene leerstukke van die strafreg. Ongeag die onderwerp in die 
algemene leerstukke wat ’n mens ondersoek, is daar altyd veel daaroor te lees 
in die literatuur oor die ooreenstemmende onderwerp in ander lande. Die 
strafreg leen horn by uitnemendheid tot regsvergelykende ondersoeke.
Na my mening openbaar die strafreg in Suid-Afrika, vergeleke met die strafreg 
in ander lande, 'n groot leemte deurdat dit nie gekodifiseer is nie. Tot tyd en wyl 
ons strafreg gekodifiseer is, kan die legaliteitsbeginsel in die strafreg nie tot sy 
reg kom nie. Ek het my eie kodifikasie van die strafreg gepubliseer en volstaan
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met die argumente ten gunste van kodifikasie wat ek in die voorwoord van 
hierdie publikasie geskryf het.
Die krisis in die strafregpleging
As ander mense vir my vra wat die vakgebied is waarin ek 'n professor is, en ek 
“die strafreg' sê, volg daar gewoonlik 'n kreun o f een of ander uitdrukking van 
die ander persone waaruit dit duidelik blyk dat hulle nie vee! van my vakgebied 
dink nie. Die rede hiervoor is die misdaadgolf wat gedurende rofweg die 
afgelope dekade en ’n half oor Suid-Afrika spoel. en die oënskynlike onvermoë 
van die straffegsisteem om dit hok te slaan.
Hierdie is nie ’n gepaste geleentheid om my opinie oor die oorsake van die 
huidige misdaadgolf te bespreek nie. Ek het die reeds in my boeke oor die 
strafreg (en meer bepaald in my bespreking van die strafteorieë) gedoen. Soos 
dit tans in Suid-Afrika aangaan, is ons besig om die stryd teen misdaad te 
verloor. Daar kan baie redes hiervoor aangevoer word, maar onder die 
vemaamstes is die onvermoë en onbevoegdheid van ’n te klein polisiemag, 
asook die afskaffmg van die doodstraf deur die Konstitusionele Hof in Staat v 
Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (KH); 1995 2 SASV 1 (KH). Hoe goedbedoel 
hierdie uitspraak ook was, het die geskiedenis bewys dat dit verkeerd was. Nog 
nooit in die vredestydse geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika was die waarde van die 
menslike lewe laer as sedert in die invoering van die ‘reg op lewe’, die begrip 
‘sanctity of human life’ en gepaardgaande daarmee, die afskaffmg van die 
doodstraf nie. Hierdie stelling is nie 'n eie subjektiewe, persoonlike of seifs 
ideologiese opinie nie. Dit is ’n koue statistiese feit. Ek gee nie te kenne dat daar 
iets verkeerd is met die Handves van Regte en die reg op lewe daarin vervat nie. 
Na my mening het die Grondwetlike Hof in Makwanycme se saak egter die 
Handves verkeerd vertolk. Meer gedetailleerde motivering vir hierdie standpunt 
kan in my handboek oor die strafreg gevind word, en ek bly by hierdie 
standpunt.
Die howe het ook in hulle benadering tot strafoplegging na my mening die 
afgelope paar dekades te veel waarde geheg aan die relatiewe strafteorieë soos 
afskrikking en hervorming ten koste van vergelding, of soos hierdie teorie in 
polities meer korrekte taal deesdae in Amerika genoem word, ‘verdiende loon' 
(‘just desserts’).
Afrikaans as regstaal
Dit is vir my jammer om die afgelope tyd te merk hoe Afrikaans as regstaal 
verwaarloos word. Afrikaanse regsakademici skyn meer en meer onwillig te 
wees om in hulle eie moedertaal te skryf en verkies om eerder in Engels te skryf. 
Ek vind hierdie verskynsel bejammerend. Om in Afrikaans te skryf is nie ’n 
teken van politieke verkramptheid nie. Die Afrikaners kan daarop trots wees dat
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hulle, anders as ander taalgemeenskappe buite Engels, deur die jare ’n eie 
vaktaal en regstenninologie geskep het. Selfs regstydskrifte wat voorheen byna 
uitsluitlik Afrikaanse artikels gepubliseer het, se inhoud is deesdae byna 
uitsluitlik in Engels. As ek so voorbarig mag wees om ’n voorstel te maak oor 
hoe om Afrikaans as regstaal beter te beskerm, sou dit wees om voor te stel dat 
iemand die voortou neem om ’n nuwe regstydskrif genaamd ‘Die Afrikaanse 
Regstydskrif te stig.
Belangstelling buite die reg
Wat my belangstellings buite die reg betref, het die akademiese lewe my ’n 
relatiewe vryheid gebied het om allerhande ander belangstellings te volg.
Ek hou baie van reis, binne sowel as buite Suid-Afrika.
Ek lees graag, en wat ek lees sou ek nie beskryf as ‘populêre leesstof nie. Ek 
het nog altyd baie belanggestel in filosofie, en lees graag boeke daaroor. 
Moontlik het hierdie belangstelling van my ook ‘n invloed op my geskrifte oor 
die strafreg gehad.
Sedert my hoërskooldae het ek ’n groot liefde vir klassieke musiek -  Schubert 
se ‘Du holde Kunst’. Benewens om daama te luister oor die radio of op CD’s, 
hou ek ook van goeie klassieke musiekkonserte. Ek speel se lf’n bietjie klavier, 
meestal klavierduette of komposisies vir twee klaviere saam met my vrou. Ek 
speel ook tjello, en het in die verlede in amateur-simfonie-orkeste soos die 
Johannesburgse simfonie-orkes en die Universiteit van Pretoria se simfonie- 
orkes gespeel. Tans is ek ’n lid van 'n kamermusiekgroep wat kamermusiek 
soos trios, kwartette of musiek vir ander kombinasies van instrumente speel. Na 
my aftrede neem ek ook soms waar as orrellis in verskillende kerke. Dit is nogal 
lekker om na my aftrede om nege-uur op ’n Maandagmore nie op kantoor hoef 
te worstel met een of ander lastige administratiewe probleem in verband met 
afstandsonderrig nie, maar in plaas daarvan in ’n dolleë kerk agter die orrel in 
te skuif en te oefen aan ’n Bach koraalvoorspel!
Carel Rainier Snyman 17.12.1940
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Tydens ’n navorsingsbesoek by die Max-Planck-Institut Fiir auslándisches und 
intemationales Strafrecht, Freiburg im Breisgau, Duitsland, 1973
Op kantoor in die Departement Staf- en Prosesreg, Universiteit van Suid-Afrika
Vakhoof van die Strafregvakgroep, Departement Straf- en Prosesreg, saam met 
voor: Proff Sunette Lotter, Louise Jordaan en Karin Alheit 
agter: Advv Abet Ramolotja en Loutjie Coetzee
. . .  du holde Kunst...
Met eggenote Fernanda, dogter Marina en seun Rainier
Money to be paid to a tsunami relief fund 
as a condition of a suspended sentence or 
as a fine in traffic offences
Peel M  Bekker
HULDEBL YK
Ek ken Kallie persoonlik sedert 1975. Ons het vir 18 jaar binne loop- 
afstand van mekaar gewoon en sedert 1977 vir 13 jaar daagliks per bus 
Unisa toe en tenig gery!
Dit is 'n groot plesier om iemand soos Kallie persoonlik te ken en ook om 
saam met horn te w'erk. Hy is ’n goeie vriend en kollega. Dit is so gerus- 
stellend om Kallie in die omgewing te he want geen probleem in die 
strafreg kon horn ooit onderkry nie. Hy word inderdaad as een van die 
grootste kenners op die gebied van die strafreg beskou. Sy werk Strafreg/ 
Criminal law word as gesaghebbend beskou en is ‘n ontontbeerlike bron 
wat onder andere in die biblioteek van elke hof in die land aangetref
word.
Saam met sy uiters bekwame en aangename eggenote, Fernanda, was 
Kallie deur die jare ‘n groot bate vir Unisa.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
The tsunami that struck several countries in the Indian Ocean area on 26 
December 2004 is believed to have killed more than 220 000 people and left 
more than one million homeless. Relief funds were established, among others, 
by the Scottburgh Rotary Club. A Scottburgh magistrate took a bold, innovative 
and controversial step in ordering fines imposed by him to be donated to this 
Tsunami Relief Fund. Later he diverted a total of R44 500 in fines to the fund 
run by the local Rotary Club. Some time later the same court imposed a fine of 
R22 000 which was also given to the Rotary fund. In the same court an accused 
pleaded guilty to cheque forgery and was fined R 22 000, payable to the fund. 
In another case a person who was trapped driving at 220 km/h in a 100 km/h 
zone and who allegedly attempted to evade arrest, appeared in the same court 
pleading not guilty. The state entered into a plea bargain with the accused. He 
was offered a suspended sentence on condition that he pay a portion of the fine 
to the tsunami relief effort. The accused accepted and the magistrate fined him 
R 20 000 or one year’s imprisonment which was suspended for five years on
'BA (Law) LL B (Pretoria) LL D (Unisa).Professor of Criminal and Procedural Law:School of 
Law, University of South Africa.
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condition that he was not caught speeding again during the period of suspen­
sion, and that he pay R 8 000 to the Scottburgh Rotary Tsunami Relief Fund -  
which he did. The magistrate said that every other traffic offender after that 
entered into a plea bargain with the state and offered their fines to be paid to the 
same relief fund, to which the magistrate agreed. Another person who was 
caught speeding at 184 km/h, was fined R15 000 (or sixth months’ imprison­
ment) suspended for five years on condition he pay R5 000 to the fund. An 
attorney was caught driving at 172 km/h and was fined R4 000, also suspended 
on condition that he pay R4 000 to the fund.1
SUSPENDED SENTENCES2 *
Definition
A suspended sentence is a sentence which has been imposed, in all the detail 
that is required for the proper imposition of such sentence, but of which the 
operation is suspended for a specified term, subject to the offender fulfilling the 
conditions on which the suspension has been based. A sentence that is wholly 
suspended is not executed unless the conditions for its suspension are broken by 
the offender. Sentences can also be partly suspended. In such cases the 
unsuspended part is executed, but the suspended part not -  unless the conditions 
are not complied with, '
The statutory provision for suspended sentences
A court may suspend any sentence except for an offence in respect of w'hich any 
law prescribes a minimum punishment,4 *but this is largely negated because 
section 297(4) still allows for the partial suspension of such punishment. Even 
though the Act does not provide for other exceptions, two more have received 
some attention. The first is if a particular statute specifically excludes the 
suspension of any portion of a sentence imposed in terms of that statute. A 
second potential exception results from mandatory punishment, although 
Terblanche is of the opinion that, as long as there is no express provision to the 
contrary, even a mandatory punishment can be suspended."'
Sentences w hich may be suspended
Section 297(1 )(b) of the Act simply states that the court may pass sentence and 
then suspend it. It neither specifies nor limit these sentences. It is fair to assume 
that all sentences which a court may impose are included. There is no doubt that 
sentences consisting of ordinary imprisonment and fines can be suspended.6 The 
maximum term for which a sentence may be suspended is five years. In the Free 
State exceptional circumstances are required before the maximum of five years
This happened at the beginning of 2005. See The Sunday Tribune 23 January 2005 page 1.
" I make full use of Terblanche The guide to sentencing in South Africa (1999) 412 et seq, as well
as Hiemstra/Kriegler Suid-Afrikaanse strafproses (6ed) 750 et seq.
JJ Joubert Criminal procedure handbook (7ed 2005) 291.
Section 297(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 -  hereafter referred to as the Act. 
Terblanche n 2 above at 413-4.
6/t/at 413.
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is employed, but this is not required in the other divisions.s The Free State point 
of view gives the impression that it is unreasonable to expect of people not to 
commit crime, a view that cannot be supported.''
The decision to suspend sentences
The decision whether to suspend the imposed sentence or not is part of the 
sentence discretion of the trial court.7 8*10 *13Suspended sentences have two main 
functions:
(1) to serve as alternative to imprisonment in situations where the offender 
cannot afford a fine and where other forms of punishment are improper, mainly 
because the offence was not particularly serious; and
(2) to serve as an individual deterrent to the offender since it is in effect, a sword 
over his head."
The purpose of suspending sentences
The purpose which the court wishes to achieve through the suspension of the 
sentence is an important consideration in the decision to suspend the sentence. 
It should always be a realistic purpose such as deterrence and rehabilitation.1- 
One of the earliest reported judgments on the question of the purpose or the 
effect of suspended sentences is that by Hawthorn JP in Persadh v R } '
Ordinarily [a] suspended sentence has two beneficial effects: it prevents 
the offender from going to gaol ... The second effect of a suspended 
sentence, to my mind, is of very great importance. The man has a sentence 
hanging over him. If he behaves himself he will not have to serve it. On 
the other hand, if he does not behave himself he will have to serve it. That 
there is a very strong deterrent effect cannot be doubted.
With this background in mind, the purposes of a suspended sentence can now 
be discussed.14
Individual deterrence
There is little doubt that the suspension of an imposed sentence on a negative 
condition (see below) has one major overriding purpose, namely to act as 
individual deterrent on the offender.1' Du Toit16 considers prevention to be one 
of the purposes of a suspended sentence. He argues that the ‘first offender can 
usually be prevented from repeating his criminal conduct because he has a
7S v Nabote 1978 1 SA 648 (O).
8S v Cobothi 1978 2 SA 749 (N); S v Van Rensburg 1978 4 SA 481 (T).
gJoubert n 3 above at 291-292.
'°S v Herold 1992 2 SACR 195 (W).
" S v  Allan 1984 2 SA 731 (T).
,2S v Roscoe 1990 2 SACR 125 (W) 129b-c.
131944 NPD 357 358.
14I can do no better than to quote extensively, sometimes verbatim, from Terblanche n 2 above 
at 417-419 and Joubert n 3 above at 291-293
l5See eg S v Dreyer 1990 2 SACR 445 (A) 448d.
u,Du Toit et al Commentary> 28-42B.
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sentence hanging over him.’ Prevention in this sense is nothing other than 
individual deterrence, since a suspended sentence cannot actually prevent an 
offender from re-offending. It is often said that this suspended sentence hangs 
over the head of the offender like the proverbial ‘sword of Damocles’.1
Mitigation o f sentence
M itigation of sentence is the second purpose of suspended sentences. It has been 
well summarised by Cloete J in S v Herold:18
It is equally the purpose of a suspended sentence to prevent, where this can 
legitimately be done, a productive member of society being sent to prison 
or a particular offender (especially a young offender) being exposed to the 
undesirable influence of hardened criminals.
Rehabilitation
The purpose of suspending a sentence is to ameliorate the sentence with mercy 
(compassion) with the view to rehabilitating the offender. This happens with the 
expectation that the offender will follow the correct course while carefully 
observ ing the suspended sentence.19
Suspension o f lengthy term o f imprisonment
It is generally inappropriate to suspend long terms of imprisonment in 
conjunction with long terms of effective imprisonment.2"
It is also inappropriate to impose a long term of imprisonment, and then to 
suspend it, or most of it.
THE CONDITIONS OF SUSPENSION
When considering the conditions of suspension it is useful to distinguish 
between negative and positive conditions (even though our courts do not use this 
distinction, but see Hiemstra and Kriegler 754). Negative conditions are the 
most common conditions and require of the offender not to repeat the crimes 
specified. They are called ‘negative’ because they do not require any positive 
action by the offender, only the requirement that he/she refrains from doing 
something criminal. Positive conditions however, require positive action on the 
part of the offender in order to fulfil the conditions of suspension; examples are 
payment of compensation or performing community service. In other words, 
the offender is required to do something positive in order to prevent the 
suspended sentence from being carried out. When positive conditions are 
imposed, they are usually combined with a negative condition also.7 18*201
l7Terblanche n 2 above at 417.
181992 2 SACK. 195 (W) 197I-J.
'^Sv Allart 1984 2 SA 731 (T) 733H.
20S v Mhlakaza 1997 1 SACR 515 (SCA) 524b.
:iTerblanche n 2 above at 292; 413.
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Examples of positive conditions include compensation, community service, 
correctional supervision, submission to instruction or treatment and the 
attendance of courses or treatment at specified centres.
Statutory provision
A sentence may only be suspended if such suspension is subjected to ‘any 
condition referred to in paragraph (a)(i) (of section 297)’. Without a condition 
the suspension is incomplete and improper. The conditions mentioned in the Act 
are both specific and general.
Specific conditions 
These are:
(1) Compensation (subparagraph (aa))
(2) Benefit or service in place of compensation (subparagraph (bb))
(3) Community serv ice (subparagraph (cc))
(4) Correctional supervision (subparagraph (ccA))
(5) Submission to instruction or treatment (subparagraph (dd))
(6) Submission to supervision by probation officer (subparagraph (ee))
(7) Attendance of or residence at a centre of some kind (subparagraph (ff))
General conditions 
These are:
(1) Good conduct (subparagraph (gg))
(2) Any other matter (subparagraph (hh)), the latter being a free discretion for 
the court in relation to sentencing and the conditional suspension of sentence.22 *24
This discretion is very wide indeed but it must be interpreted in the spirit of the 
preceding paragraphs and take into consideration the fact that the conditions 
must be related to the offence in question.2.
Requirements for conditions in general
Introduction
The locus classicus with regard to the requirements which conditions of 
suspension should meet, is R v Cloetef Reynolds J stated:
(Two) principles at least should be observed. The first is that the condition 
imposed should bear at least some relationship to the circumstances of the 
crime which is being punished by the imposition of a suspended sentence.
It need not be closely related but should be related to it in some degree at 
least, even though slightly related, and not divorced from it. The second 
is that the condition be stated with such precision that the convicted person 
may understand the ambit of the condition.
Any condition of suspension has to conform to three basic requirements:
22Du Toil 375-6.
'Hiemstra/Kriegler 761.
241950 4 SA 191 (O).
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(1) It must be related to the committed offence.
(2) It must be stated clearly and unambiguously.
(3) The conditions must be reasonable.2’
(1) It must be related to the offence in question
Any condition must have some relation to the crime for which the accused was 
convicted and it was again emphasised that conditions of suspension should not 
be framed too widely.2*' Generally this requirement has been used to determine 
which crimes a negative condition should be made subject to. No direct 
connection is required, with the result that the conditions need not be restricted 
only to the crime for which the offender has been convicted. Whether a 
condition is sufficiently related is a matter of ‘logic and equity’.2 Various 
attempts have been made to define this relationship more clearly, eg by stating 
that it must be ‘material’,* 278 2930*but generally such definitions have not lasted.2 '
In S v Stanley10 it was decided that there must be ‘a rational and causal 
connection between the offence and the damage in respect of which the 
compensatory order is made’. Nor must it be so wide that it has no nexus with 
the offence concerned.’’ Where a suspended sentence is imposed subject to the 
condition that the accused not again be convicted of an offence of which 
dishonesty is an element, the condition of suspension is too vague. '2 In S v 
Grobler33 it was decided that conditions of suspension should not be unduly 
onerous and should remain reasonably possible for the accused to comply w ith. 
On the other hand, there is every reason to impose a condition covering any 
future commission of common assault where the accused was convicted of 
common assault but the sentence was suspended on condition only that he was 
not convicted of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm.34 35In S v 
Tsanshana "a term of imprisonment imposed for theft was suspended on 
condition that the accused not be convicted of an offence of which dishonesty 
is an element and committed during the period of suspension. It was held that 
the condition was cast too widely and that it should be amended to ‘that the 
accused is not convicted of theft or attempted theft committed during the period 
of suspension and for which he is sentenced to imprisonment without the option 
of a fine’.
‘Joubert n 3 above at 292-3.
2bS v Mjware 1990 1 SACR 388 (N) 389q.
27S v Stanley 1996 2 SACR 570 (A) 574a-b.
aS  v Radebe 1973 3 SA 940 (O).
29S v Van den Berg 1976 2 SA 232 (T) 234 H; S v Tshaki 1985 3 SA 373 (O) 376G-J and the 
cases referred to there.
301996 2 SACR 570 (A).
3'S v Maluleke 1977 4 SA 545 (T).
32S v Goeieman 1992 1 SACR 296 (NC).
331992 1 SACR 184(C).
’4S v Louw 1992 1 SACR 688 (Nm). Also see 5 v Titus 1996 1 SACR 540 (C)
351996 2 SACR 157 (EC).
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(2) The conditions must be stated dearly and unambiguously
The condition must be clear and the accused should know exactly what conduct 
may lead to his having to serve the sentence.36 *38It is undoubtedly more clear to 
specify the crimes which an accused should not repeat rather than to use phrases 
such as ‘crimes of which force is an element’; ‘crimes of which dishonesty is an 
element’3 or ‘crimes for which theft is a competent verdict’.3S
In S v Point Blank Promotion CC39 40the court referred to unnecessary and very 
onerous conditions including reference to a number of offences involving petty 
offences. The conditions were set aside.
Where the condition is related to prevention of criminal conduct by the accused, 
it should be made clear that a conviction of an offence committed within the 
period of suspension will break the condition.411
The condition must not be such that it can be breached by some occurrence 
outside the control of the accused,41 42*nor should it be breached by a petty 
contravention (which may bring into operation a heavy sentence).4"
A suspended sentence must be such that the magistrate thinks it will probably 
be put into force and which he/she thinks can justifiably be put into force if the 
conditions for suspension are breached. What is of cardinal importance is that 
the suspended sentence must be an appropriate sentence for the offence 
committed.4'
The determination of what the accused had to do in order to avoid the sentence 
being carried out should be determined by the court and not left to the discretion 
of. for example, a probation officer.44 45*
A condition of suspension stipulating that the accused has to submit an essay on 
the evils of an offence (eg shoplifting) gives rise to a number of problems and 
a sentence that contains such a condition is normally not a proper sentence.4'
(3) The conditions must be reasonable
In addition to the two requirements which stem from S v Cloete46 another 
requirement has developed over the years. This requirement is that the 
suspending conditions have to be reasonable. In essence this means that they
36S v Xhaba 1971 ISA  232 (T); R v Cloete (supra) 192; 5 v Valashia 1973 3 SA 934 (O).
VS  v Mjware 1990 1 SACR 388 (N); Goeieman 1992 1 SACR 296 (NC).
38See Terblanche n 2 above at 426.
” 1996 2 SACR 275 (T).
40SvM algas 1979 3 SA 178 (A)181; S v Xhaba 1971 1 SA 232 (T).
41SvG aika  1971 1 SA231 (C).
42S  v Allart 1984 2 SA 731 (T).
“SvSchultz 1991 1 SACR 679(E).
44SvCronje 1991 2 SACR 619 (C).
45S v Mbola 1992 2 SACR 175 (E).
^See note 23.
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should be formulated in such a manner that they will not cause future unfairness 
or injustice. This means, inter alia, that compliance with the conditions should 
not be outside the control of the accused47 and should be reasonably possible for 
the offender to comply with and not be too onerous.48 *The conditions should 
also take into account human fallibility44
The conditions should not be worded in such a way that a petty offence may 
trigger a severe suspended sentence. In several cases the accused was convicted 
of dealing in dagga and sentenced to a (partially) suspended term of imprison­
ment on condition that, inter alia the accused was not found guilty of the 
possession of dagga. One can hardly argue that these two offences are not 
sufficiently related, but possession of a minute amount of dagga would normally 
breach the conditions upon which the (usually) severe sentence for dealing in 
dagga was suspended. For this reason it has become customary to include an 
extra condition for the latter offence, such as ‘for which imprisonment, without 
the option of a fine, of more than four months is imposed'.50
Fines
According to s 90 of the National Road Traffic Act, No 93 of 1996, all fines 
imposed or moneys estreated as bail in respect of any offence in terms of that 
Act shall be paid into the appropriate accounts as determined by the laws of 
each province.
Except in cases where statutory authority exists for such an order, a court is not 
entitled to direct that any portion of the fine go to the complainant in the case 
or to an informer or anybody else. The fine must go to the state.51
CONCLUSION 
Suspended sentences
The applicable general condition for the relevant suspended sentence is ‘any 
other matter'' -  see s 297( 1 )(a)(i)(hh) of the Act. It creates a free discretion for 
the court to conditionally suspend a sentence and the condition must be related 
to the offence in question. As a requirement for conditions in general the 
condition of suspension must also be related to the offence in question.52 It is 
submitted that there is no relationship between a traffic offence in South Africa 
and the tsunami o f2004. As was stated by Kessie Naidu, former chairman of the 
Road Accident fund:
While it is worthy to make a contribution to the Tsunami Relief Fund, I am 
certain there are deserving organisations in South Africa that deal with
47S V Gaika 1971 11 SA 231 (C) 232A-B.
*sS v Grob/er 1992 1 SACR 184(C) 185i-j.
AS v Allan 1984 2 SA 731 (T) 736A;S v Heroic! 1992 2 SACR 195 (W) 198j.
AS v Adams 1986 3 SA 733 (C); S v Herald 1992 2 SACR 195 (W), and see Joubert n 3 above 
at 292.
"'Joubert n 3 above at 285.
5:See the text next to footnotes 22-23 and 24-35.
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victims of road accidents, which would have been a more relevant cause 
to contribute to / '
Fines
It is submitted that it is also irregular to order that a fine should not go to the 
state but to a relief fund."4
S3See article in Sunday Tribune, 23 January 2005 1. 
54See text accompanying footnote 51.
A saga of snitches and whistleblowers: 
the boundaries of criminal liability for 
breach of statutorily-imposed duties 




It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim 
every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the law which would 
punish him in every case for not performing his duty is too harsh for 
man. (Justice Marshall in Marbury v Brooks 20 US 556 at 575—6 
(1822).)
Introduction
The common law, both in its civil and criminal form, has always been 
reluctant to extend the boundaries o f liability to include failures to act or 
speak. To a large extent the motivation for this reticence is to maximise the 
liberty of the individual who fails to act or speak, allowing him or her to 
remain supine or silent in certain circumstances -  but also acknowledging 
that in different, exceptional instances the law might compel action or 
speech.
The divide between Anglo-American and Continental jurisprudence on 
liability for omissions reflects a fundamental difference of approach to the 
nature of law itself. The Anglo-American system of tort and criminal law 
developed from a premise that law essentially prohibits one from causing 
harm to another, including the state, and generally does not require one to 
benefit another. Continental systems tend to approach the problem from the 
perspective o f altruism or beneficence, requiring positive duties in more 
circumstances than their Anglo-American counterparts and recognising the 
confluence of law and morality.1 While South African law, influenced by 
Anglo-American legal philosophy, has tended to follow the approach to 
liability for omissions that maximises individual liberty at the expense of 
altruism, there are signs that the list o f exceptional duties to act or speak is
BA LLB (Natal) LLM Dip in Comparative Legal Studies (Cantab) PhD (Wits) Professor of 
Criminal Law in the University of Cape Town. Ms Amanda Torr, a Teaching Research 
Assistant in the Department of Criminal Justice at UCT, helped considerably in collecting 
European legislation and European and American literature on reporting duties and 1 am 
indebted to her for her invaluable assistance. I should also like to thank Cathy Powell, of the 
Department of Public Law at UCT, for her most helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
article.
'Jonathan Burchell & John Milton Principles o f  criminal law (3ed 2005) 187.
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being judicially expanded in the civil law and legislatively extended in the 
criminal sphere. This development has unfortunately occurred in a 
piecemeal fashion.
The Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa 
have recently broadened the base o f civil liability by imposing duties on the 
state to protect persons from violent crime and human rights abuses.2 *
At the same time, the legislature has been busy extending statutory duties, 
especially in the context of the fight against organised crime, corruption and 
teiTorism and has in the process imposed criminal liability, often carrying 
severe penalties, on ordinary persons for failing to act or to speak. The focus 
of this article is on a critical evaluation of these newly imposed statutory 
duties and how they encourage a culture o f informing and how they in fact 
threaten fundamental principles underpinning the common law. The article 
attempts to develop theoretical and policy reasons for distinguishing the 
commendable recent judicial imposition of positive duties on the state to 
protect others from violent crime and human rights abuses from the less 
defensible legislative imposition of positive duties on ordinary citizens to 
assume the role of the state in protecting it and others from organised crime. 
In the process, a distinction emerges between what Garland calls the 
‘responsibilization strategy" (whereby the state invokes the assistance of 
non-state organisations and individuals to assist in the fight against crime and 
where the watchwords are ‘partnership’ and ‘cooperation’)4 and the transfer 
of state functions in criminal detection to civil society under threat of 
criminal sanction.
These new reporting duties that appear in legislation designed to combat 
organised crime and corruption epitomise the insidious relocating o f the 
burden of crime investigation and detection onto the shoulders of the 
ordinary citizen. It might be argued that in this way the primary duty in the 
detection and prosecution of crime that rests on the state is shared with the 
individual. Compulsory enlisting of the assistance of citizens in the light 
against organised crime on pain of criminal sanctions is clearly 
distinguishable from the voluntary cooperation of citizens in community 
policing endeavours. It is, perhaps, understandable that a state that has 
limited resources to deal with all manifestations of crime will try to enlist the 
help of its citizens in the detection of crime on a voluntary basis -  it is
2See generally Burchell & Milton n 1 above at 188. 191-4, 196-205 and the cases discussed 
there. The survey in the work was written before judgment was delivered by the 
Constitutional Court in Rail Commuter Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 
359 (CC). This judgment confirms the ‘accountability’ of government as the basis tor the 
extension of this legal duty on the part of the state.
'D Garland ‘The limits of the sovereign state: strategies of crime control in contemporary 
society’ (1996) 36 British Journal o f Criminology’ 445 at 452.
4See also Valsamis Mitsilegas Money laundering counter-measures in the European Union 
-  a new paradigm o f security’ governance versus fundamental legal principles (2003) 12 and 
151-4.
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another matter for the state to punish its citizens with the full force of the 
criminal law if they do not provide the appropriate level of assistance. If one 
wants to widen the chasm between the state and the individual in the matter 
of crime control, the imposition of criminal sanctions against those who 
refuse to speak out against their fellow citizens is a very effective way of 
doing so.
The most debatable strategy is where the state imposes often severe criminal 
sanctions on private organisations and ordinary persons for failing to report 
criminality or suspected criminality to the police (sometimes based on a 
negligence fault element) rather than encouraging voluntary vigilance and 
engaging the private sector in a collaborative venture in combating crime. 
Even if reliable evidence sufficient to reinforce a prosecution for money 
laundering could be secured by this heavy-handed means of compelled 
reporting (and statistics indicate that the contrary is true),5 the price paid for 
interfering with confidentiality and privacy would be far too high.
Legal duties to act or speak can never be considered in isolation. Even if a 
legal duty to act or speak were to be imposed, whether by statute or common 
law, liability for its breach would only follow if the other elements of civil 
or criminal law were established. This means that in many cases, a causal 
link between omission and unlawful consequence would have to be 
established and fault in the form of intention or negligence would have to be 
proven. Causation and fault provide additional limiting devices that serve to 
curtail the scope of criminal or civil liability within reasonable proportions. 
If, tor instance, statutory liability is imposed for failing to report to the 
police, or some other public authority, the suspicion that a crime might be or 
has been committed, then if this liability is not dependent on proof of a 
causal link between the failure to act or speak and the commission of the 
offence and is, furthermore, not dependent on proof of an intentional or 
deliberate failure to report but is, at most, based on a negligent failure to 
report, these limiting devices are absent or at least diminished.6 Should such 
open-ended individual liability be countenanced by a system of criminal (or 
even civil) law that should be based on maximising individual freedom of 
action and fundamental rights? Does one's civic duty extend to being an 
informer? It is debatable whether it should but, even if it does, should 
criminal breach of this duty extend to negligent conduct when a breach of the 
duty to report is the sole determinant o f the actus reusl
'See the data cited by Mitsilegas n 3 above which indicate that although the number of reports 
of money laundering is high, the translation of this evidence into actual convictions is 
disappointingly low.
6It is interesting to note that even Pamela H Bucy, a proponent of imposing enforceable legal 
duties on private individuals to report transactions over a certain financial limit in the fight 
against money laundering, advocates that this duty only apply in cases where there is clear 
proof of intentional wrongdoing: ''Epilogue: the fight against money laundering: a new 
jurisprudential direction’ (1993) 44 Alabama LR 839 at 861. See further, below, where the 
argument for an intention-based liability for failure to report is developed.
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Section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
imposes a duty on certain persons to report corrupt practices; section 12 of the 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act's imposes a duty on a person, who has reason to suspect that 
another intends to commit, or has committed, a ‘terrorist’ offence or is aware 
of the presence at any place of a person who is so suspected o f intending to 
commit or having committed such offence to report the suspicion to the 
police; and section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA)’’ 
imposes a duty on a person who carries on a business or who is employed by 
a business to report suspicious or unusual transactions regarding the proceeds 
of unlawful activities. Not only is the imposition of criminal liability for such 
omissions in the above statutory instances highly contentious, but the 
potential linking of liability to negligent failures to act or speak is doubly 
contentious. This article both challenges the practice of suggesting 
negligence as the fault basis for criminal liability in these new statutory 
duties imposed on individuals and questions the overall legal justification for 
compelling ordinary persons, under threat of the criminal sanction, to 
become agents of the state.
Before critically evaluating the precise formulation of the new statutory 
duties, the scene needs to be set by highlighting the reasons for the 
underlying antipathy of the general public and the law to ‘informers’.
The semantic scene
Words such as ‘snitch’,* 8910 *‘grass’, ‘rat’ and ‘squealer’ reveal the disdain with 
which not only the criminal fraternity, but also the general public, regards the 
informer. An allegation that a person is an informer may even be 
defamatory." The rather more neutral term ‘informer’ itself carries 
unpleasant connotations, often linked to the exchange of money for 
information.12 The evolution of the Zulu word phimpi (meaning a species of 
cobra) to ‘impimpV (informer) would appear to chart a not inappropriate 
derivation and one that carries considerable apartheid baggage.13
More recently, the term ‘whistleblower’ has come into vogue, perhaps in an 
attempt to restore some respectability to the conduct of the informer or, at
12 of 2004. which came into force on 27 April 2004.
833 of 2004, which came into force on 20 May 2005.
938 of 2001, which came into force on 3 February 2003.
"’The noun ‘snitch’ is probably derived from the underworld slang meaning ‘the nose’ and the 
verb ‘snitch’ is a variant o f ‘snatch’ meaning to ‘steal, pilfer’: Online etymological dictionary. 
In terms of prisoners’ slang ‘snitch’ means ‘An informant, rat’: a prisoner’s dictionaiy 
http://dic-tionarv.prisonwall.oru/. accessed 21 October 2005.
'|See JM Burchell (1974) 91 SAL) 178 at 192-5.
i;John Ellison Kahn et al (eds) The right word at the right time -  a guide to the English 
language and how to use it 291.
1 ’ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission o f South Africa Report (1998) contains reference 
to the fact that during apartheid ‘[tjargets of attack were repeatedly people seen as linked to 
the apartheid system (councillors or their families, police, sell-outs) and invariably rumoured 
to be, or identified -  whether justifiably or not -  as impimpis (informers)’.
14 Jonathan Bure hell
least, to attempt to show that the disclosure is linked to warning the 
authorities of some potential illegality that can possibly be prevented by the 
disclosure. However, there is little doubt that reporting the activities of 
another to the police, whether these activities are criminal, merely suspected 
of being criminal or innocent, carries connotations of some underhanded 
behaviour. In fact, any potential justification for reporting actual or 
supposedly illegal conduct to the authorities is stronger where the conduct 
reported is unanimously considered criminal in nature. Justification for 
reporting conduct which is not uniformly regarded as criminal (or where the 
clear-cut definition of the illegal nature of the conduct is less obvious) is 
more contentious. Justification for reporting to the authorities apparently 
innocent conduct that might lead to illegal behaviour is also difficult to 
justify.14 Any stain attaching to the informer attaches even if the reporting is 
unremunerated although in practice such reporting is often rewarded in some 
way.
At best, the attitude of the criminal justice system to informers is 
ambivalent.1" Like the use o f criminal traps they are seen in some instances 
as a necessary evil in the fight against crime. But, even in those cases where 
the pragmatic justification for the use of informers might be seen as strong, 
any benefit in encouraging informers to disclose information must be 
weighed carefully against the disadvantages of disclosure to society and 
possibly the pursuit or the vocation of the informant. Furthermore, the 
imposition of a duty to speak enforced by criminal law sanction must be 
regarded as a last resort and, even where exceptional circumstances impelling 
such duty exist, proof of intentional failure to disclose must be established.
In short, the activities o f the snitch, the ‘grass’ or ‘impimpi’ is often not only 
frowned upon by society but even subjected to physical retribution or 
retaliation. The unenviable Hobson’s choice facing individuals in South 
African society, in the context o f the legislation reviewed in this article, is 
stark: comply with one’s statutory obligations to inform on suspected 
criminal activities but ultimately face potential extra-legal retaliatory 
vengeance from society generally; alternatively, remain loyal to one’s fellow 
citizens and breach the statutory duty o f disclosure so running the risk of 
conviction of a criminal offence and sentence to a hefty fine or imprisonment 
for a considerable period.
l4The law of defamation recognises this by regarding an allegation that someone has reported 
apparently innocent conduct to the authorities as a clearer impairment of the alleged 
informer’s reputation than where the informer is alleged to have informed the authorities on 
clearly criminal conduct: see JM Burchell(1974)91 SAL) 178 at 192-5. An instance of a duty 
to report on innocent (as well as possibly criminal activity) is that which might be imposed 
on accountable and reporting institutions by s 28 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 
of 2001 to report cash transactions over a certain prescribed limit. This section has been 
passed by the legislature but a date has not yet been set for its implementation.
'Gerard E Lynch ‘The lawyer as informer’ (1986) Duke U  491.
